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STATE POWER AND PREEMPTION IN THE
NUCLEAR ENERGY FIELD: PACIFIC GAS
AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE ENERGY
RESOURCES CONSERVATION &
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION
Congress and the states share the power to regulate the nuclear
energy industry.' This joint regulatory power creates conflict be-
tween the federal and state governments2 as each attempts to address
the safety, health, and economic problems prevalent in the nuclear
energy field.3 The nuclear waste disposal issue in particular high-
lights the tension between the federal government, the states, and the
nuclear energy industry. 4 While states seek to expand the scope of
1. See infra text accompanying notes 55-68. See also In re Consolidated Edison
Co. of N.Y., 7 N.R.C. 31, 31-32, 34 (1978).
2. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-88 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as TRIBE] (for an explanation of how congressional intent and the
supremacy clause limit state and local power).
3. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1718 (1983). Writing for the majority, Justice White
reviewed scientific and government studies regarding nuclear energy and nuclear
waste and concluded that "there are both safety and economic aspects to the nuclear
waste issue: first, if not properly stored, nuclear wastes might leak and endanger both
the environment and human health; second, the lack of a long-term disposal option
increases the risk that the insufficiency of interim storage space for spent fuel will lead
to reactor shutdowns, rendering nuclear energy an unpredictable and uneconomical
adventure." Id See also Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble.- Is Such a
State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOOY L.Q. 679, 711-12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Tribe, Calfornia Declines]. (California's nuclear regulatory scheme seeks not only
peace of mind (for safety reasons) but also an approach economically superior to
indefinite year-to-year storage).
4. See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 602 F.2d
412, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (state challenge to NRC decision granting two nuclear
power plant operators license to expand on-site capacity for nuclear storage). The
Court indicated the "crux of the case is current uncertainty about the prospects for
developing and implementing safe methods for the ultimate disposal--or even long-
term storage- of the highly toxic radioactive wastes." Id. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co.
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1717 (1983)
("The interrelationship of federal and state authority in the nuclear energy field has
not been simple."). See also Jaksetic, Legal Aspects of Radioactive High-Level Waste
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their authority by regulating problems connected with the disposal of
nuclear waste, the nuclear energy industry and the federal govern-
ment seek to limit the states' role by claiming preemption by federal
law.' In Pacfc Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Con-
servation & Development Commission,6 the Supreme Court applied
the preemption doctrine to this conflict7 and held that states may pro-
hibit the construction of new nuclear plants without preempting fed-
eral authority until the federal government develops and approves a
means to dispose of nuclear waste. 8
In 1976, California imposed a moratorium9 on the licensing of new
nuclear power plants effective until the State Energy Commission de-
termined whether the federal government proposed a permanent so-
lution for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste.' 0 Forced to
Management, 9 ENVTL. L. 347, 361-79 (1979) (discussing the complex system of legal
authority involving several federal agencies and state efforts to gain further control of
nuclear waste regulation).
5. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir.
1971), af'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); See also Jaksetic, supra note 4, at 403 ("The trend
of states to enter the field of nuclear power regulation indicates political opposition to
various aspects of commercial nuclear power and as a challenge to federal assertions
of preemption in the area."). See generally Murphy & LaPierre, Nuclear "Morato-
rium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemp-
tion, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 392 (1976) (reviewing the extent of federalism conflicts in the
nuclear energy field).
6. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
8. 103 S. Ct. at 1722.
9. Id. at 1719. The California Legislature added three provisions to the Warren-
Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act of 1974, CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-986 (Deering 1976 and Supp. 1984), to provide for addi-
tional regulation of new nuclear power plant construction: § 25524.1(a) (regulating
fuel reprocessing); § 25524.1(b) (determination by Energy Commission of adequate
storage capacity for spent fuel); § 25524.2 (imposing moratorium on new nuclear
plant construction); and § 25524.3 (certification conditioned upon commission study
and report to legislature of the necessity, effectiveness, and economic feasibility of
undergrounding and berm containment of reactors). Section 25524.2 imposes a mora-
torium on the certification of new nuclear plants until the Energy Commission "finds
that there has been developed and that the United States through its authorized
agency has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the
disposal of high-level nuclear waste." Id See generally Pacific Legal Found. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 1981)
(discussing amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act); Tribe, California Declines, supra
note 3, at 682-83.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 1719. For a discussion of the problems associated with high-level
nuclear wastes, see Jaksetic, supra note 4, at 348-61. See generally Note, Nuclear
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postpone or cancel plans to construct new nuclear facilities," private
utilities claimed that the Atomic Energy Act of 195412 preempted the
state's action' 3 and challenged it under the supremacy clause. 14 The
district court agreed with the utilities' contention.' 5 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court, however,' 6 and the Supreme Court af-
firmed the appeals court decision. 7
The framers of the Constitution designed the supremacy clause as
a check on state power.' Beginning with its decision in Gibbons v.
Waste Management: A Challenge to Federalism, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 917, 917-28 (1979)
(proper treatment of waste and potential risks inherent in existing disposal methods
uncertain).
II. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 489 F. Supp. 699, 701 (E.D. Cal. 1980); Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and
the Burger Court: California's Nuclear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C.D. L.
REV. 3, 6 (1979).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 1719-20. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1982).
13. 103 S. Ct. at 1719-20; 489 F. Supp. at 700-02. The utilities directed their at-
tack against numerous provisions of the Warren-Alquist Act, but only § 25524.2 and
25524.1(b) were reviewed by the Supreme Court. The Court held only § 25524.2 ripe
for review since "questions concerning the constitutionality of the interim storage
provisions, § 25524.1(b)" should await further development because "we cannot
know whether the Energy Commission will ever find a nuclear plant's storage capac-
ity to be inadequate." Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides that the "Constitu-
tion and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;.
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land."
15. 489 F. Supp. at 704. For a critical analysis of the district courts' opinion, see
Note, May a State Say "No" to Nuclear Power? Pacific Legal Foundation Gives a
Disappointing Answer, 10 ENVTL. L. 189 (1979).
16. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resource Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th
Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit consolidated Pacfc Gas and Pacofc Legal Foundation
m the same appeal. Pac'fc Legal Foundation involved a related challenge to
§ 25524.2 brought by a nuclear engineer hired to work on a proposed nuclear plant
who subsequently lost his job when the project was abandoned. The court of appeals
held that the nuclear moratorium provisions of § 25524.2 were not preempted because
§§ 271 and 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2018 and § 2021(k) consti-
tute a congressional authorization for states to regulate nuclear power plants for pur-
poses other than protection against radiation hazards. 103 S. Ct. at 1719-20.
17. 103 S. Ct. at 1713.
18. See generally NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 RE-
PORTED BY JAMES MADISON (Norton ed. 1969) (reviewing the framers' concerns
about a weak national government); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 378 (1819) ("The means of giving efficacy to the sovereign authorities
vested by the people in the national government, are those adapted to the end; fitted
to promote, and having a natural relation and connection with, the objects of that
1984]
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Ogden, the Supreme Court has demonstrated support for the fram-
ers' plan and applied the supremacy clause to preempt state action
which obstructs or conflicts with a valid exercise of federal power.' 9
Yet there is no definitive formula which the Court applies to deter-
mine whether federal law preempts state action.2" The Court en-
gages in federalism balancing,2' a subjective analysis22 guided by
principles which help determine on a case-by-case basis2" whether
the purpose and scope of a congressional act precludes state action.24
government. The constitution, by which these authorities, and the means of executing
them, are given, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are declared to be the supreme
law of the land; and they would have been such, without the insertion of this declara-
tory clause. They must be supreme, or they would be nothing."); Freeman, Dynamic
Federalism andthe Concept ofPreemption, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 630 (1972) (reviewing
the history and need for the supremacy clause).
19. Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Gibbons v. Ogden: "The nullity of any act,
inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the constitution
is the supreme law." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824). "'[A]cts of the State Legis-
latures... [which] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in
pursuance of the constitution,' are invalid under the Supremacy Clause." Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (emphasis in original) (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S.
at 211).
20. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940) (Courts must determine in each
case whether state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."); TRIBE, supra note 2, at 377; Note, The
Preemption Doctrine: Shfting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 623, 624 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Preemption Doctrine].
21. Congress can expressly preempt state action, but in most cases Congress re-
mains silent and courts must determine on a case-by-case basis whether Congress
implicitly intended to preempt the states. 'The Court uses techniques of 'federalism
balancing' in an effort to preserve a domain of state regulatory power. . . by employ-
ing presumptions and balancing standards and by assigning weights to the competing
interests to be balanced .... " Wiggins, supra note 11, at 10-11.
22. Id. at 10. Professor Wiggins argues that preemption cases depend upon the
individual judge's state of mind. "Gone are the Justices who could be relied upon to
engage Wechsler's admonition [that a valid constitutional decision could be based on
neutral principles]." Id. at 9. "Subjective judicial values about the proper balance of
state and federal regulatory authority have become increasingly important in the
Court's disposition of cases raising federalism issues." Id. at 10.
23. "Our prior cases on preemption are not precise guidelines. . . for each case
turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme." City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973) (local noise
control curfew preempted by Noise Control Act).
24. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 643-
44 (1973) (implied preemption depends upon federal statutes clear intent); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); see also Freeman,
supra note 18, at 639-40.
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The Supreme Court first articulated a framework for federalism
balancing in Hines v. Davidowitz.2" The Court in Hines struck down
a state alien registration law because Congress had "occupied the
field" with a pervasive, detailed scheme for the registration and regu-
lation of aliens.16 Although no actual conffict existed between the
state and federal laws,2 7 the majority emphasized that the state law
stood as an obstacle to the strong federal interest in uniform registra-
tion of aliens.28 Justice Stone's dissent2 9 cautioned against the rapid
expansion of national power 3° and argued that a presumption against
preemption 3' should help the Court define the "boundaries" when
the states and the federal government share the regulatory field.3 z
25. 312 U.S. 52 (1940). Later Supreme Court decisions have incorporated the
standards established by Hines in their preemption analysis. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (Act of Congress in a field of dominant
federal interest precludes enforcement of state laws on the same subject); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (preemption criterion is whether state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress).
26. 312 U.S. at 63, 66-67.
27. Id. at 78 (Stone, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 73-74 (Stone, J., dissenting).
29, Id. at 74-81 (Stone, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 74-75 (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice Stone recognized that Congress'
power to legislate could "greatly enlarge the exercise of federal authority" and dimin-
ish the powers of the states. Id. at 75. "At a time when the exercise of the federal
power is being rapidly expanded through Congressional action, it is difficult to over-
state the importance of safeguarding against such diminution of state power. ... "
Id. The "presumption against preemption" is one label applied to a presumption
favoring the validity of state laws in preemption cases.
31. Professor Wiggins states that the presumption against preemption shifts the
burden of proof to the federal government "when the language or history of the fed-
eral enactment does not obviously require otherwise and when the state's purpose in
regulating is to promote what the Court finds to be an important objective of in-
dependent and traditionally local concern." Wiggins, supra note 11, at 25. Justice
Stone's dissent in Hines argued that the Court should apply a presumption favoring
the states:
The Judiciary of the United States should not assume to strike down a state law
which is immediately concerned with the social order and safety of its people
unless the statute plainly and palpably violates some right granted or secured to
the national government by the constitution or similarly encroaches upon the
exercise of some authority delegated to the United States for the attainment of
objects of national concern.
312 U.S. at 75 (Stone, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also Note, The Preemp-
tion Doctrine, supra note 20, at 645.
32. 312 U.S. at 78-79 (Stone, J., dissenting).
1984)
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Six years later the Court established a framework for preemption
analysis which incorporated Stone's presumption against preemp-
tion.33  In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation,4 a warehouse
owner licensed under the U.S. Warehouse Act challenged the validity
of duplicative state license laws. Because states traditionally regu-
lated warehouses,35 the Court stated that a presumption against pre-
emption favored the state law unless Congress clearly intended to
preclude state action.36
The Court considered four factors relevant to a determination of
congressional intent:37 1) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
scheme; 2) the strength of the federal interest; 3) whether state and
federal laws had the same purpose; 4) whether state policy produced
a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.38 Each
of these factors weighed in favor of preemption if Congress regulated
in any way the matter on which the state asserted the right to act.39
33. See generally Freeman, supra note 18, at 638-40 (standard test for preemption
is one of congressional intent).
34. 331 U.S. 218 (1946).
35. Id. at 230.
36. Id. The Court's preemption analysis began with this underlying premise: "So
we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the state were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Id.
37. The Court applied an implied preemption analysis "test," following the guide-
lines established in Hines. 312 U.S. at 230. Commentators refer to the Rice analysis
as occupational preemption. While Congress refuses to act on the particular matter
before the Court, state action is preempted because Congress occupies the regulatory
field. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 384-85; Wiggins, supra note 11, at 30-41 (occupation
preemption forecloses state authority).
38. 331 U.S. at 236. The Court considered each of these factors in subsequent
preemption decisions. For pervasiveness of the federal scheme and a dominant fed-
eral interest, see e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (regulating
oil tanker design and operations); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.
624, 633 (1973) (regulation of aircraft noise); Northern States Power Co. v. Minne-
sota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1153 (8th Cir. 1971), aft'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (regulation of
nuclear power plant construction and operation). For similarity of purpose, see e.g.,
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 534 (1977) (regulation of package labeling).
But see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1970); Florida Lime and Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("The test. . . is whether both regula-
tions can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not
whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives."). For inconsistent results,
see e.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (regu-
lation of "due-on-sale" clauses in mortgage contracts).
39. 331 U.S. at 236.
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The Court followed Hines and Rice in preemption cases for several
years,40 but the Burger Court takes a different approach toward the
preemption doctrine.4' In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Ware,42 the Court articulated a federalism balancing test which is
more deferential toward state law.43 The Court upheld a California
law which protected wage earners from forfeiture clauses despite a
New York Stock Exchange rule which allowed them.' The Court
altered the Rice preemption framework by giving great weight to the
state's interest.45 The Ware preemption analysis emphasized recon-
ciliation between the state and federal schemes, 46 and rejected a test
that preempts state action solely because it frustrates any part of the
purpose of federal legislation.47
Ware did not end the Hines and Rice influence in preemption
analysis. 41 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions applied the general
40. See supra note 38. See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1970) (list-
ing cases that have adhered to the Hines preemption test).
41. See Wiggins, supra note I 1, at 25:
The Court has settled on an analytic framework for preemption disputes, it has
reemphasized the importance of identifying the precise state and national inter-
ests at stake, and it has given tentative signals about. . . a judicial preference for
upholding state regulatory power against claims of preemption.
Id. See also Note, The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 20, at 649.
42 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
43, Id. at 139. The court emphasized it would not favor preemption of state law
"in the absence of persuasive reasons" or a persuasive and comprehensive scheme of
federal regulation. Id. (quoting Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
44. The Court decided that the strong state policy of protecting its wage earners
from undesirable economic pressures affecting the employment relationship, out-
weighed the means selected (forfeiture clauses for employee profit-sharing plans) by
the New York Stock Exchange to prevent an employee of one securities firm from
switching to a competitor. Id. at 138-40.
45 414 U.S. at 129-30. Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). The Burger Court found Congress' amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act invalid under the commerce clause because they "operate to directly displace the
states' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions, that are not within the authority granted Congress. . . ." Id. at 852. For
an argument that state decisions on nuclear energy are protected under the National
League of Cities doctrine, see Wiggins, supra note 11, at 67.
46 414 U.S. at 127 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963)). The Court noted its analysis would be sensitive to federalism problems.
"The proper approach is to reconcile the operation of both statutory schemes with one
another rather than holding one completely ousted." Id.
47 414 U.S. at 139.
48 See infra notes 49-50. See also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
19841
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principles of Hines and Rice to preempt state action, either because
Congress occupied the field of regulation, 49 or because an actual con-
flict existed between federal and state law." The Court, however,
continues to decide preemption cases according to their particular
facts,"' and the outcome in each case continues to depend on the
Court's analysis of a federal statute read in "light of its constitutional
setting and its legislative history.",
5 2
When applying preemption analysis in the nuclear energy field, the
Court must necessarily consider the Atomic Energy Act53 which es-
tablished the basic scheme of federal regulation. 4 The Act created a
government monopoly controlled by the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) in order to promote the peaceful development of nuclear
power.55
Congress amended the Act in 195456 to end the government mo-
470, 479-80 (1974) (state trade secret law not preempted by federal patent law); De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357-58 n.5 (1976) (state law prohibiting knowing employ-
ment of ilegal aliens not preempted by federal immigration law).
49. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
50. "Actual conflict" preemption is characterized by a state law that stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
142 (1982). See also Comment, .4 Preemption Analysis of California's Moratorium on
Nuclear Plant Construction: Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resource Con-
servation and Development Comm'n, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1258, 1261-63 (1982).
51. For example, Justice Douglas observed that "each case turns on the peculiari-
ties and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in question." Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminals, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
52. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice
Stone's dissent laid the groundwork for the Court's later preemption decisions by
questioning the Hine's majority preemption analysis:
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated formula
that Congress "by occupying the field" has excluded from it all state legislation.
Every Act of Congress occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of
that field before we can say that it has precluded a state from the exercise of any
power reserved by the Constitution. To discover the boundaries we look to the
federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legisla-
tive history.
Id.
53. See supra note 12.
54. See Murphy & LaPierre, supra note 5, at 394-398 (discussion of the Atomic
Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954).
55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982); S. REP. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1327, 1327-29.
56. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (as amended).
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nopoly57 and to encourage private participation in the development
of nuclear power under strict AEC supervision." Congress also ad-
ded section 27 19 in order to preserve the states' traditional authority
to regulate the economic aspects of electrical power.60
Between 1954 and 1959 many states assumed a greater role in the
nuclear energy field by regulating and registering radiation sources. 61
Uncertainty concerning the scope of these state actions led Congress
to amend the Act in 1959.62 The addition of section 274 evinced a
congressional intent to clearly define the responsibilities of the states
and the federal government in order to prevent dual jurisdiction.63
Section 274 specifically precludes the states from regulating the con-
struction and operation of any nuclear production or utilization facil-
ity,' but expressly retains state authority to regulate AEC licensees
for health, safety, and economic purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards.65
In 1965, Congress amended section 271 of the Act to redefine the
permissible limits of state and local power to regulate the economic
aspects of nuclear energy. 66 Influenced by the Ninth Circuit's deci-
57. See Murphy & LaPierre, supra note 5, at 395.
58. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3456, 3465-66.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1976).
60. Section 271 provided that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect
the authority or regulations of any federal, state or local agency with respect to the
generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nu-
clear facilities licensed by the Commission." Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073,
§ 1, 68 Stat. 960 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1982)). S. REP. No. 390,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, 9-10 (1965) (§ 271 intended to affirm states' authority over all
sources of power generation).
61. See Murphy & LaPierre, supra note 5, at 398-99.
62. Id. at 399.
63. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2872, 2878-79. See also Murphy & LaPierre, supra note 5, at 399-401.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976).
65. Section 274(k) stated: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
authority of any state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards." The Atomic Energy Act Amendments of 1959,
Pub. L. 86-373 § 1, 73 Stat. 688 (1959). See also S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., Ist
Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2872, 2880; Tribe, Caifornia
Declines, supra note 3, at 702-03.
66. Congress amended § 271 of the Atomic Energy Act in 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 2018,
amended bv Pub. L. 89-135. 79 Stat. 551 (1976): "Provided that this section shall not
be deemed to confer upon any federal, state, or local agency any authority to regulate,
1984]
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sion in Maun v. United States,67 upholding a local ordinance which
prohibited overhead power lines to a nuclear research facility author-
ized by the AEC,68 Congress determined that state and local authori-
ties could not restrict the AEC's activities through their control of
69electric power.
As states gained awareness of the safety and environmental
problems associated with nuclear power, they heightened their regu-
latory activity.7° Increased concern for the high-level radioactive
wastes generated by nuclear reactors71 led Minnesota to enact a law
regulating radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants.72
The utility industry challenged the Minnesota statute in Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota.73 In this landmark preemption case
in the nuclear energy field,74 the Eighth Circuit rejected the states'
regulation of radioactive waste as an invalid exercise of the police
power.75 The Court held that the Atomic Energy Act preempted the
states' regulation of radioactive effluents because it was "inextricably
intertwined" with the AEC's sole authority to regulate radiation
control, or restrict any activities of the Commission." Id (emphasis in the original).
67. 347 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1965).
68. Id. at 978.
69. The legislative history of the 1965 Amendment includes an extensive discus-
sion of the Maun case. Concerned that the Ninth Circuit decision would open the
door to substantial state and local interference with nuclear energy development,
Congress amended section 271 to overturn Maun and clarify its intent to prevent any
federal, state or local agency from hampering AEC activities. See H.R. REP. No. 567,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2775, 2775-88.
70. See generally Murphy and LaPierre, supra note 5, at 415-17.
71. For a discussion of the history behind the nuclear waste problem, see Lucas,
Nuclear Waste Management: .4 Challenge to Federalism, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 917, 933-40
(1979). See also L. GOULD, The Radioactive Waste-Management Problem in Too
HOT TO HANDLE (C. Walker, L. Gould & E. Woodhouse eds. 1983).
72. Minnesota's Pollution Control Agency specified conditions under State law
regulating the level of radioactive liquid and gaseous discharges and required moni-
toring programs for the detection of such releases. The conditions imposed were
more stringent than those imposed by the AEC. See Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1971), af'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
73. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), af'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
74. See Comment, supra note 50, at 1258. Several other courts faced with state
action that interfered with the Atomic Energy Act followed Northern States. See infra
notes 82-83.
75. 447 F.2d at 1145. Minnesota argued that the State's traditional power under
the tenth amendment to protect and promote the health, safety, and general welfare
of its citizens provided the authority to regulate radioactive waste. Id.
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hazards associated with the operation of nuclear facilities.76
Northern States did not prevent other states from gaining greater
regulatory control in the nuclear energy field,77 but the decision sig-
naled to the states to shift their efforts toward problems not associ-
ated with nuclear power plant radiation hazards.78 First, the states
focused on environmental concerns79 by enacting comprehensive sit-
ing laws to control nuclear plant construction and operation,80 and
by regulating radioactive waste disposal inside8" and outside their
borders.8 2 The courts, however, continued to strike down state laws
which interfered with federal authority to regulate radiation hazards
76. Id. at 1150-53. The Court applied an occupation preemption analysis to the
Atomic Energy Act. It determined that 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) did not give the states
authority to regulate radioactive discharges. Congress intended to give the AEC sole
authority to regulate the operation of nuclear power plants and its comprehensive
licensing scheme preempted the Minnesota law. Id.
77. See Murphy & LaPierre, supra note 5, at 419-20.
78. Parenteau, Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants.- A Constitutional Dilemmafor
the States, 6 ENVTL. L. 675, 691 (1976). Mr. Parenteau notes that "Northern States
served as a warning to the states to focus their attention on non-radiological health
and safety issues associated with nuclear power plants." Id. In particular, states be-
gan to regulate the siting of nuclear plants as an exercise of their authority to regulate
land use. Id.
79. See id. See also Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal Systems Response
to Nuclear Power, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 616 (1982) (state and local governments
acted on a broad range of issues loosely grouped under the rubric "environmental").
80. See Paranteau, supra note 78, at 697. See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 3-301 to § 3-304 (1977) (comprehensive energy facilities siting law). See also Note,
California's Nuclear Power Plant Siting Legislation: A Preemption Analysis, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1979) (state regulation of nuclear power plant location, con-
struction, operation, and decommission is directed at numerous objectives).
81. See Jaksetic, Constitutional Dimensions of State Efforts to Regulate Nuclear
Waste, 32 S.C.L. REV. 789, 824-48 (1981). Mr. Jaksetic identifies six categories for
state legislation dealing with nuclear wastes: I) prohibiting the disposal of out-of-
state radioactive waste within their borders; 2) prohibiting nuclear waste facilities in
their states; 3) requiring legislation or other state approval of nuclear waste facilities;
4) regulating radioactive waste disposal sites; 5) regulating transportation of nuclear
waste; 6) regulating nuclear waste disposal in other ways, such as state moratoriums.
See id.
82. State bans on the transportation and storage of out-of-state radioactive waste
within state borders have been held unconstitutional on both commerce clause and
supremacy clause grounds. See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th
Cir. 1982) (state cannot prevent nuclear waste from being imported for storage), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983); Washington State Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v.
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (statute closing borders to entry of low-level
radioactive waste invalid), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1891 (1983).
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of nuclear power plants and nuclear waste.83 In Train v. Colorado
Public Interest Research Group, Inc.,84 the Supreme Court affirmed
Northern States85 and rejected an attempt by Colorado to impose
stricter effluent standards on nuclear power plants under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).8 6 The Court held that Con-
gress intended the AEC to retain full authority to regulate radioactive
"pollutants" unaltered by the EPA's authority agency under the
FWPCA.87
Second, states attempted to obtain greater control of the problems
associated with nuclear energy by influencing the licensing proce-
dures of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).88 Several states
joined with environmental groups to prevent the NRC from licensing
83. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (city ordinance requiring a certificate of health and safety invalid exercise of
police power); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light
Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976) (nuclear facility not liable under state law for
deaths of fish caused by reactor cooling system); Marshall v. Consumers Power Co.,
65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.E.2d 266 (1975) (state preempted from regulating radioac-
tive hazards of emergency core cooling system); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollu-
tion Control Bd., 5 Ill. App. 3d 800, 284 N.E.2d 342 (1972) (state regulation of
radioactive discharge standards preempted by federal law). See also Jaksetic, supra
note 81, at 795 n.34.
84. 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
85. Id. at 15-16. The Court noted that Northern States left no room for the states
to regulate radioactive discharges from nuclear power plants. Id.
86. Id. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1982), would have allowed the states to adopt effluent limitations more stringent
than those required or established by the Act through the development of state permit
programs. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), (c) & 1370 (1982).
87. 426 U.S. at 15.
88. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (AEC procedural rules for environmental impact
statements upheld on nuclear energy conservation issues); Minnesota v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (operating licenses to
permit expansion of on-site nuclear waste storage capacity); New Hampshire v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969) (AEC properly refused to con-
sider evidence of thermal pollution in licensing procedures), cert denied, 395 U.S. 902
(1969). Congress transferred the licensing and related regulatory functions of the
AEC to the NRC in §§ 5841 and 5842 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5801-91 (1982). See S. REP. No. 980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1974). Con-
gress also created the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) to
promote the development of nuclear energy through government research and pro-
duction facilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801(b), 5811-17 (1982). See S. REP. No. 980, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 5470, 5470-5538;
CONF. REP. No. 1445, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5470, 5538-5553.
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new nuclear power plants until the federal government solved the
nuclear waste disposal problem.89 Some states also attempted to
force the Commission to assign greater weight to environmental and
health factors in regulatory proceedings.9" Both efforts failed.9 '
Third, the states proposed indefinite moratoriums on the construc-
tion of new nuclear power plants.92 California enacted moratorium
provisions in 1976 based on its traditional authority to regulate the
economic aspects of electrical generation.9" Faced with the prospect
that California's activities could halt the development of nuclear en-
ergy,94 the utility industry challenged the California Act and placed
89 See. e.g.. Minnesota v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 602 F.2d
412 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (state challenge to expansion of on-site capacity for storage of
nuclear waste). See also Murphy & LaPierre, supra note 5, at 433 (state legislation
threatens to conflict directly with NRC's licensing and regulation function).
90. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (health hazards of radioactive wastes in environ-
mental impact statements); New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170
(I st Cir. 1969) (environmental effects of thermal pollution), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 902
(1969).
91. Generally, the Supreme Court will not interfere with procedural rules used by
the NRC unless a statute mandates substantive reasons. See Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 557 (1978)
(-Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy, establishing a reasonable
review process in which courts are to play a limited role."). Cf. Maleson, supra note
79, at 616 (attempts to challenge the safety of nuclear power generation and the dispo-
sal of radioactive waste have failed because judicial activism is not characteristic for
nuclear energy issues).
92. Professors Murphy and LaPierre list various state moratorium proposals
which by 1975 indicated that the states were contemplating more extensive control in
regulating nuclear energy. See Murphy & LaPierre, supra note 5, at 420. See also
Tribe, California Declines, supra note 3, at 707 n.134.
93. See wupra note 9 and accompanying text. For a detailed explanation of the
California provisions, see Tribe, California Declines, supra note 3, at 682-83, 708-19.
94. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. The State's actions were re-
sponses to the federal government failure to deal with the growing radioactive waste
disposal problem. The General Accounting Office noted "the involved problem of
radioactive waste disposal threatens the future of nuclear power in the United States."
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, The United States Nuclear Energy Dilemma:
Disposing of Hazardous Radioactive Wastes Safety, quoted in Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 166, 175
(2d Cir. 1978). Congress did not enact legislation to deal with the radioactive waste
problem until passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Pub. L. 97-425, 96
Stat. 2201 (1983) 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-226 (West 1983). The legislative history the
government's failure to provide for a repository development program "seriously un-
dermined the strength of the domestic nuclear industry." H. REP. No. 491, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3792, 3794-95.
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the nuclear regulatory conflict before the Supreme Court in Pacific
Gas.95
The Court96 acknowledged that there were both safety and eco-
nomic aspects of the nuclear waste problem97 and that California en-
acted the moratorium in response to these concerns.98 The Court set
up a Hines and Rice framework for preemption analysis in order to
test the validity of the California Act.99 Because states traditionally
regulated economic aspects of energy generation, the Court incorpo-
rated a presumption against preemption into its analytical
framework.'00
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the Atomic Energy
Act and concluded that Congress intended to preserve dual regula-
tion in the nuclear energy field.' The federal government main-
tains complete control of the safety and radiological aspects of energy
generation, while states retain their authority to determine the need
for new nuclear facilities, land use, and ratemaking.
10 2
The Court examined the California statute and distinguished regu-
95. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
96. The decision of the Court was unanimous. Justice White delivered the
Court's opinion. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, filed an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment.
97. Id. at 1718. Justice White stated: "First, if not properly stored, nuclear wastes
might leak and endanger both the environment and human health; second, the lack of
a long-term disposal option increases the risk that the insufficiency of interim storage
space for spent fuel will lead to reactor shutdowns." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1722. See supra text accompanying notes 25-39.
100. Id. at 1723. The Court determined that the need for new power facilities,
their economic feasibility, and rates and services are aspects of electrical generation
that have been regulated "for many years and in great detail by the States." Id.
Thus, its preemption analysis started "with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946)).
101. Id. The Court indicated that the Atomic Energy Act does not expressly nor
impliedly require the states to construct or authorize nuclear power plants or prohibit
the states from deciding not to permit the construction of any further reactors. Id. at
1722. "Congress. .. intended that the federal government should regulate the radio-
logical safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant,
but that the States retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating elec-
trical utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, cost and other related
state concerns." Id.
102. Id. at 1726.
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latory provisions aimed at safety concerns from those intended to
deal with economic problems.' 3 The Court, in dictum, noted that it
would preempt any state prohibition on construction of nuclear en-
ergy plants "grounded in safety concerns" because the federal gov-
ernment had "occupied the entire field of nuclear safety."" Since
the California law addressed economic problems and not radiation
hazards, the statute fell outside the prohibited field and the Atomic
Energy Act did not preempt the state's action.'05 Because the Court
refused to inquire into the legislative motive behind the State law, it
ignored the petitioner's claim that the purpose of the California law
was radiation safety and not economic reliability.'0 6
Justice Blackmun's concurrence leaves open the possibility that
states may increase the breadth of their authority on safety as well as
economic grounds, prior to the construction and operation of a nu-
clear power plant.' 7 Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's dic-
tum that a state may not prohibit the construction of nuclear power
plants if motivated by safety concerns.1'1 Rather than evaluate the
103. Id. at 1726-27.
104. Id. The respondents argued that although safety regulation of nuclear plants
by states is forbidden, a state may completely prohibit new construction until its
safety concerns are satisfied by the federal government. Id. at 1726.
The majority rejected this broad view of state power but Justice Blackmun argued
that the states should be able to reject new nuclear power plants on any grounds,
including safety, "to exercise their traditional police power over the manner in which
they meet their energy needs." Id. at 1733.
105. Id. at 1726 n.24. The Court did not find any conflict between its summary
affirmance of Northern States and its Pac~flc Gas decision. Northern States did not
control Pacqfc Gas because Minnesota's law regulated radioactive waste discharges, a
safety concern reserved for federal authority. Id. at 1726 n.24.
106. Id. at 1728. "Inquiry into legislative motive is often an unsatisfactory ven-
ture." ld. The Supreme Court relied on the court of appeals review of the Warren-
Alquist Act's legislative history, which concluded that the California Legislature
adopted the moratorium law because "uncertainties in the nuclear fuel cycle make
nuclear power an uneconomical and uncertain source of energy." Id. at 1728 (quot-
ing 659 F.2d at 925). See also Tribe, California Declines, supra note 3, at 708-21. But
see Comment, supra note 50, at 1270-81 (The California law affects radiation safety
and should be preempted).
107. 103 S. Ct. at 1732-35.
108. Id. at 1732. Justice Blackmun stated three reasons for rejecting the majority
view that a state's safety-motivated decision to prohibit construction of nuclear power
plants would be preempted. First, Congress did not occupy the broad field of "nu-
clear safety concerns," but only the narrower area of how a nuclear plant should be
constructed and operated to protect against radiation hazards. Id. at 1732. Second, a
flat ban for safety reasons on power plant construction would not conflict with the
NRC's judgment that construction of nuclear plants may safely proceed, because
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validity of state regulation in the nuclear energy field based on the
"elusive test" of legislative motive, 09 Justice Blackmun would up-
hold a state ban on construction of nuclear power plants for any rea-
son as a valid exercise of the states' traditional police power to
determine how to meet their energy needs."'
Pacl'c Gas is consistent with other Burger Court decisions since
Ware"' which have employed a presumption against preemption to
uphold state action in a field occupied by both Congress and the
states." 2 Although the Court reached a correct result by upholding
the California moratorium law," 3 the majority's reasoning did not
settle the state and federal conflict over the scope of regulatory au-
thority in the nuclear energy field.
It is clear that a state cannot regulate safety aspects of nuclear en-
ergy, including the construction and operation of reactors. It remains
unclear to what extent a state may regulate matters such as nuclear
waste disposal, which combine both safety and non-safety concerns.
By linking state action and legislative motive," 4 the Court created a
scheme by which states may expand the scope of their authority by
using economic purposes as a pretext for safety regulation.
Since the Burger Court will not look to the legislative history of
state laws,' 5 Pacftc Gas sends a message to the states that they may
neither the NRC nor Congress has mandated that the states must also find nuclear
power safe. Id. at 1733. Third, a safety-motivated ban does not violate the Hines
preemption standard because Congress has "merely encouraged the development of
nuclear technology" and has not forced the states to accept it as an energy source. A
ban, therefore, does not conflict with Congress' objectives or purposes. Id. at 1734.
109. Id. at 1735. See supra note 105.
110. 103 S. Ct. at 1733. Justice Blackmun drew a distinction "between the thresh-
old determination whether to permit the construction of new nuclear plants and, if the
decision is to permit construction, the subsequent determinations of how to construct
and operate those plants. The threshold decision belongs to the State; the latter deci-
sions are for the NRC." Id.
111. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
113. The Court's step-by-step analysis of the Atomic Energy Act is consistent with
its review of the Act in Northern States and CoPirg. But the conclusion that Congress
did not intend to preempt state moratoriums based on economic grounds until the
federal government develops a permanent radioactive waste disposal solution is valid
only if the State's action is construed to focus on nonradiation hazards.
114. See supra text accompanying note 105. See supra note 108 and accompany-
ing text (Justice Blackmun's concurrence recognized the majority's reliance on the
State's motive or purpose as a "benchmark" for validity).
115. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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continue to address the growing safety, environmental, and economic
problems associated with nuclear energy and radioactive waste dispo-
sal. Faced with increased regulatory activity and financial problems
Pacjic Gas may force the nuclear energy industry to push Congress
for legislation further defining the permissible boundaries of state
regulatory activity.
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